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Evidence from a small European market 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An important issue in finance is whether noise traders, those who act on information that has no 
value, influence prices. Recent research indicates that investor sentiment affects the return 
distribution of a few categories of assets in some stock markets. Other studies also document that US 
investor sentiment is contagious. 
 This paper investigates whether Consumer Confidence (CC) and the Economic Sentiment Indicator 
(ESI) – as proxies for investor sentiment – affects Portuguese stock market returns, at aggregate and 
industry levels, for the period between 1997 to 2009. Moreover the impact of US investor sentiment 
on Portuguese stock market returns is also addressed. 
We find several interesting results. First, our results provide evidence that consumer confidence 
index and ESI are driven by both, rational and irrational factors. Second, ESI is significantly negative 
related to stock returns. Sentiment negatively forecasts aggregate stock market returns, but 
not all industry indices returns. Finally, we don’t find a contagious effect of US investor 
sentiment in Portuguese market returns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G10, G11. 
Keywords: Behavioural Finance, Investor Sentiment, Industries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A widely discussed issue in finance is the extent to which asset prices reflect fundamental value. 
According to Fama (1970), information flow is the only determinant of movements in stock market 
prices and these reflect the fundamental value of the underlying assets.  
Thus, in accordance with the efficient markets hypothesis, changes in asset prices result from a 
rapid readjustment of their value motivated by the investor’s transactions in response to changes in 
the set of information. However, in the market two types of investors coexist, noise traders and 
information traders, also known as arbitrageurs or rational speculators. Arbitrageurs formulate 
completely rational expectations about security returns and their transactions ensure that prices 
converge to fundamental value. In contrast, the opinions and transaction patterns of the noise 
traders are susceptible to systematic errors and biases. The decisions of these agents are based more 
on psychological factors and sentiment than on investment management principles. 
According to Baker and Wurgler (2007) investor sentiment represents a belief about future cash 
flows and risk which is not justified by economic and financial information. Brown and Cliff (2004) 
considered that “sentiment represents the expectations of market participants relative to a norm: a 
bullish (bearish) outlook means investors expect returns to be above (below) average, whatever 
“average" may be” (p. 2). 
In the last decades a number of researchers in the field called behavioural finance have been 
interested in investigating the extent to which the noise traders, who act on information that has no 
value, influence prices. For example, Shleifer and Summers (1990) highlight the role of investor 
sentiment and limits of arbitrage in asset pricing. In their approach, the authors consider two 
assumptions: first, that some investors are not completely rational and their demand for risk assets is 
affected by beliefs or sentiment not justified by the information about fundamentals. Second, that 
arbitrage – which they define as the transactions conducted by rational investors – is risky and 
therefore limited. The two assumptions jointly imply that changes in investor sentiment are not fully 
considered by arbitrageurs and thus affect security returns. 
Also Hughen and McDonald (2005) refer that the existence of significant arbitrage costs impedes 
the trading activity of rational investors. According to these authors: “The ability of arbitrageurs is 
limited if sentiment is cross-sectionally correlated and they face the risk of continued movements 
away from fundamental values” (p. 281). These conditions form the basis of DeLong et al. (1990) 
noise trader model, which shows that the transactions motivated by the sentiment may cause price 
deviations from fundamental value.  
2 
 
Qiu and Welch (2006) also consider that sentiment can influence asset prices under two 
conditions: the assets are predominantly held by noise traders and transaction costs are high enough 
to avoid arbitrage. 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) refer that mispricing is a combination of two factors: change in 
irrational trader sentiment and limits of arbitrage faced by rational investors. 
Thus, several researchers have investigated the effect of investor sentiment in asset pricing 
patterns, such as: DeBondt and Thaler (1985), DeBondt (1998), Fisher and Statman (2000), Shefrin 
(2001), Brown and Cliff (2005) Baker and Wurgler (2006 and 2007), Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006), Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2006) and Schmeling (2009), among others. 
Our study investigates whether investor sentiment predicts future aggregate stock market 
returns and industrial indices returns in Portugal, between September 1997 and April 2009, and if the 
relationship between sentiment and expected returns is significantly negative, even after controlling 
for macroeconomic factors.  
Additionally, we investigate whether US investor sentiment affects the Portuguese stock market, 
at aggregate and industry levels. 
Our study has empirical and theoretical motivations. Firstly, most of studies focus on the major 
capital markets, mainly the U.S. market. Secondly, many of the studies until now investigate the 
impact of sentiment on certain categories of assets or portfolios. There are only a small number of 
studies whose analysis focuses on the aggregate market or on specific sectors, which may contribute 
to empirical evidence of the overall impact of sentiment. 
Theoretically, most researchers in behavioural finance suggest the strong presence of noise 
traders in the stock market with sentiment correlated and limits on arbitrage as conditions that can 
lead sentiment to influence asset prices. So, our choice of the Portuguese market will make it 
possible to test some of these assumptions.  
According to Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) a collectivist culture is a driver of investors’ tendency 
to herding, which in the capital market can lead to the possibility of noise traders’ errors being 
correlated. In the context of the literature on the effects of sentiment contagion, Chang, Faff e 
Hwang (2009) state that if investors herd, then there will be stronger sentiment contagion. According 
to Hofsted (2001) Portugal has high degree of collectivism. These ideas also motivated our study. 
La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998) state that the laws that protect investors against expropriation by 
insiders affect the propensity of retail investors to participate in equity markets. If there is low 
participation by such investors in the market, there will be less tendency to speculation and thus for 
the influence of the sentiment. The authors also explored the idea that companies in countries with 
poor investor protection had more concentrated ownership of their shares. They found that 
countries with legal systems based on French-civil-law had the greatest ownership concentration. 
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According to La Porta, et al. (1998) Portugal was among the countries with high concentration of 
ownership. On the one hand, the large presence of institutional investors can lead to a situation 
where the market is less prone to the influence of sentiment. On the other hand, institutional 
investors face limits to arbitrage, as discussed above. These ideas also motivated our study. 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Peng and Xiong (2006) show that investors tend to categorize assets 
into groups, in particular, into industries. Jame and Tong (2009) reported that investment decisions 
may involve an industry wide component. This implies that industry level reallocations, by small 
investors, should occur with greater intensity than reallocations across stocks grouped randomly. 
They found that the retail investors’ trades were correlated across industries. These also motivated 
our study at industry effects.   
We found, first, that the sentiment had a negative impact on future market returns for forecast 
horizons of 1 to 12 months, which in general is consistent with the theoretical considerations of the 
impact of the noise trader behaviour. Secondly, in our industry analysis, we found that PSI 
Telecommunications was the index that showed a more similar behaviour to the aggregate market. 
For the other industry indices sentiment just had some predictive power on the future returns of the 
PSI Utilities and PSI Technology for forecasting horizons longer than 1 month. Finally, we don’t found 
a contagious effect of US investor sentiment in Portuguese market and industry returns. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews some of the existing 
relevant literature on the sentiment effect and discusses some of the sentiment measures used in 
the literature; section 3 describes the methodology; section 4 presents the main results and the 
robustness analysis; finally, section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
In section 2.1 we analyze relations between sentiment and markets behaviours both at a 
theoretical level and empirical evidence. In section 2.2 we discuss different proxies to the sentiment 
variable. 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
2.1 Behavioural effects 
 
According to researchers in behavioural finance, the presence of noise traders in markets with 
correlated behaviour and the limits of arbitrage may be considered a possible explanation for the 
existence of certain price anomalies. 
According to Andrikopoulos (2007), under-reaction and overreaction represent two of the 
assumptions that partially explain the price anomalies. Individuals’ tendency to overreact or under-
react in some circumstances derives from conservatism
2
 and representativeness
3
 heuristic 
[Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) Daniel, Hirsheifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Kaestner 
(2006)]. 
Under the representativeness heuristic, investors will consider a series of positive firm 
performances as representative of continuous growth potential, and ignore the possibility that this 
performance may be random. This sometimes leads to excessive optimism and overvaluation of firm 
announcements. 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987, 1989) argued that investors in the face of what they learn 
based on experience, become too pessimistic about the past extreme losers, and too optimistic 
about the past extreme winners, leading the former to become under-valuated and the latter over-
valuated. 
Shefrin and Statman (1997) concluded that the agents surveyed in their study expected that 
securities of companies with a winning past would continue as winners, while the opposite occurred 
in respect of securities of companies with a losing past. These facts have led to the tendency of 
analysts to recommend the purchase of securities of companies with winning pasts. 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) also confirmed the overreaction hypothesis. 
According to Andrikopoulos (2007), overreaction and under-reaction to new information can be 
viewed as a combination of the inability for investors to correctly distinguish the short and long run 
[Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)] and the excessive optimism of investors caused by biased self-
attribution.
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DeBondt (1998) showed that investors exhibited an excessive optimism and overconfidence, 
were not interested in diversification and rejected the positive relationship between return and risk. 
                                                           
2
 According to Andrikopoulos (2007): ”Conservatism, refers to the condition where investors are subconsciously reluctant to 
alter their beliefs in the face of new evidence. The main impact of this bias in investment decision making is that even if 
investors’ beliefs are changed in the light of new information, the magnitude of that change is relatively low in terms of 
what it should be under strictly rational conditions” (p. 9). 
3
 According to Andrikopoulos (2007): “Representativeness heuristic is the illusion of seeing patterns in a random walk” 
(p.10). 
4
 Self-attribution occurs when individuals attribute the success to their abilities and failures to luck. 
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According to behavioural finance authors, psychological factors may cause changes in asset prices 
not justified by fundamentals, if the sentiment is cross-sectionally correlated and if there are limits to 
arbitrage. Shefrin (2001), for example, considers that sentiment is a reflection of the aggregate 
trader’s errors. “The degree to which an individual trader’s error process affects market sentiment 
depends on the size of the trader’s trades” (p. 44). 
According to Fama (1998), irrational investors transact randomly, so the transactions probably 
cancel out. Furthermore, the arbitrage process and competition between arbitrageurs can lead to 
the accumulation of losses and consequent wealth losses for the irrational investors encouraging 
them to leave the market. Thus, according to these arguments, the market will tend to equilibrium. 
However, arbitrage is riskless only if there are securities in the market that are perfect 
substitutes, otherwise the elimination of mispricing by arbitrageurs is limited. 
Moreover, according to Shleifer and Summers (1990), there are two risk types that limit 
arbitrage: fundamental risk and risk associated with noise trading. 
Another limit to arbitrage is related to the investment horizon, which is not unlimited. Arbitrage 
often involves lending securities or money, which leads to paying out compensation to creditors. This 
may become too expensive in long run horizons. 
Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that although some changes in demand for securities by the 
investors who are completely rational, others reflect changes in expectations or sentiment and 
therefore are not fully justified by fundamental information. These changes may be in response to 
pseudo-signals which investors believe contain information about future performance, but this type 
of information is not incorporated in a completely rational model. 
However, several strategies based on popular models or false signals are correlated, leading to 
aggregate changes in demand, particularly because biases in judgments and information analysis 
tends to be common and persistent among investors, like overconfidence and investment decision-
making based on the representativeness heuristic, which can lead to overreaction to information. 
According to Shleifer and Summers (1990) the noise traders tend to be on average more 
aggressive than arbitrageurs either because they are overly optimistic or overconfident. Thus, they 
take on a higher level of risk. If the risk-taking is rewarded by the market, the noise traders can earn 
high returns, thereby acquiring even more confidence, continuing to trade thusly. According to the 
authors, the risk rewarded by the market does not necessarily have to be fundamental. It can also be 
the risk associated with the unpredictability of the noise traders’ expectations. When the noise 
traders earn high returns, other investors tend to imitate them, ignoring the fact that the gains 
obtained involved a higher level of risk and have essentially been the result of luck. This imitation 
brings to the market more application of money in strategies based on noise, because under these 
conditions investors tend to attribute the gains to their skills and not to luck. 
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Moreover, while some investors may leave the market, other new noise traders enter, and even 
those who have left market in the past may return. 
Thus, changes in demand motivated by noise traders may be relevant even in the long run. 
Although there is not a consensus on the influence of investor sentiment in stock markets, 
several studies have documented that sentiment influences returns and valuation of assets [Fisher 
and Statman (2000), Brown and Cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006), Schmeling (2009)], volatility [Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2006)], the practices of 
information disclosure and market reaction to announcements [Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), 
Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2008)]. 
Fisher and Statman (2000) analyzed the relationship between sentiment and future returns as 
well as the relationship between changes in sentiment and future returns. 
The authors, in their study considered three groups of investors: Wall Street strategists (such as 
large investors), writers of investment newsletters (medium investors) and individual investors (as 
small investors). They concluded that there was a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between the sentiment level of individual investors and Wall Street strategists and returns in the 
following month on high capitalization stocks. 
Shefrin (2001) has demonstrated that stock price variation could be broken down into two 
stochastic processes, one pertaining to fundamentals and the other to sentiment. 
Brown and Cliff (2005) used survey data on investor sentiment. These data are from Investor's 
Intelligence (II) (which tracks the number of market newsletters that are bullish, bearish or neutral) 
and showed that sentiment affected asset pricing. They concluded that the market was over valuated 
during periods of optimism. 
The results of Brown and Cliff (2005) showed that in large companies or companies with a low 
book-to-market ratio sentiment was significant in predicting future returns in 1, 2 and 3-year time 
horizons. However, small stocks seem to be less influenced by sentiment. One possible explanation 
for this result is that the newsletters contain forecasts for the market as a whole. So, this data did not 
allow the analysis and conclusion that small stocks are more prone to the influence of the sentiment 
to be made. 
Brown and Cliff (2005) refer that their results support the important conclusions of behavioural 
theory, which states that irrational investor sentiment affects asset pricing levels. 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) analyzed the times-series relationship between sentiment and 
stock returns using the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and the Conference Board 
Consumer Confidence Index as measures for investor optimism. 
The findings were consistent with the idea that investors seemed to overestimate small stocks 
relative to large stocks during periods of high confidence and vice versa. 
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According to Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), a possible explanation for small stocks be prone 
to the influence of sentiment is that such stocks are disproportionately held by individual investors 
(as opposed to institutions), who are more prone to the influence of sentiment. 
The authors also investigated this hypothesis and found that stocks with low institutional 
ownership exhibited low (high) returns following periods of high (low) sentiment. 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) studied how sentiment affected the cross-section of stock returns. 
They concluded that returns of stocks whose valuation are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage 
were constrained by investor sentiment at the beginning of the period. When sentiment was 
estimated as high, the stocks were attractive to speculators, but unattractive to arbitrageurs – young 
stocks, small stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-payer stocks, high volatility stocks, extreme 
growth stocks and distressed stocks – tended to earn lower subsequent returns. 
In their study Baker and Wurgler (2007) investigated whether speculative stocks whose arbitrage 
was difficult were more sensitive to sentiment. They concluded that when sentiment was low the 
average future returns of speculative stocks exceeded bond-like stocks returns. When sentiment was 
high the future returns of speculative stocks was, on average, lower than the returns of the bond-like 
stocks. Thus, they found that the higher risk stocks, sometimes exhibit low returns, which is 
inconsistent with classical models of asset pricing. 
Although the main objective of the above study focuses on differences in cross-section returns, 
the authors also found that there was a positive correlation between aggregate market returns and 
changes in sentiment, if the average of the stocks was affected by sentiment. 
Schmeling (2009) examined how the consumer confidence index – as a proxy for investor 
sentiment – affected stock returns internationally in 18 countries. According to the author, it seems 
reasonable that sentiment shocks affected stock markets aggregately and not just different 
subgroups of stocks. 
The author also examined how sentiment affects especially countries with low institutional 
development or countries which are especially prone to herd-like behaviour and overreaction. 
Schmeling (2009) found that sentiment had a significantly negative impact on future returns. In 
general, the results were consistent with the theoretical considerations about the impact of noise 
traders, and were in accordance with the evidence found in the US market. 
The results also revealed some heterogeneity across countries with regard to the sentiment-
return relationship. In Japan, Italy and Germany, for example, the results showed the existence of a 
strong relationship between sentiment and future returns. However, in countries like Australia, New 
Zealand or the UK there was a weak or nonexistent relationship between the two variables. The 
results for the US also revealed that this country cannot be seen as particularly prone to sentiment 
effects. Sentiment effects on returns seem to be country-specific. Regarding sentiment effects on 
returns of value stocks and growth stocks, there was some heterogeneity between countries too. 
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Schmeling (2009) also examined the extent to which sentiment influenced returns in countries 
with different cultures. He found that countries that had high levels of collectivism
5
 showed a strong 
effect of sentiment on stock returns, concluding that countries with a cultural tendency for herding 
were subject to a strong sentiment-return relationship. 
The author suggested that it cannot transfer evidence from the US to other markets and presume 
that the irrational noise traders affect stock markets in general. Conversely, he found that 
institutional quality and cultural factors were strong determinants of the sentiment-return 
relationship. According to this author, high quality market institutions seem to be desirable to 
mitigate effects of noise trading.  
Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2006) studied how sentiment might be useful in forecasting volatility. 
They found that sentiment had predictive power for future volatility when past returns were 
included. 
Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) investigated the fact that firms tried to influence sentiment 
driven expectations, varying their strategic policies on information disclosure. The authors predicted 
that disclosure policy would be adjusted in response to investor sentiment, with the amount of 
disclosure negatively associated with the level of sentiment. 
The results of this study showed that firms used information disclosure policies to influence 
investor sentiment. Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) found that during periods of high sentiment, 
managers reduced the frequency of long run earnings forecasts, while during periods of low 
sentiment the frequency of those predictions increased. 
Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2008) found that the response of stock prices to good news 
increased with sentiment, while the response of stock prices to bad news decreased with sentiment, 
which was consistent with the hypothesis that the prevailing market sentiment influenced investors’ 
response to firms' announcements in the direction of sentiment. They also found that the price 
response was more pronounced for stocks that have more subjective valuations and faced limits on 
arbitrage: small stocks, young stocks, volatile stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, growth stocks and 
distressed stocks. 
Apart from the studies mentioned, others have also examined the extent to which investor 
sentiment of a given market might influence the assets of other markets. 
Verma and Soydemir (2006) studied the degree to which American individual and institutional 
investor sentiment affects the UK, Mexico, Brazil and Chile stock markets. The results of this study 
                                                           
5
 According to Hofsted (2001), individualism reflects the degree to which people, in a given country, focus on their internal 
attributes, such as their own abilities, to differentiate themselves from others. So, according to the author, collectivism 
quantifies the degree to which individuals, in different countries, are prone to act in groups and not as individuals. 
Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) suggested that differences in collectivist behaviours may be the drivers of investors’ tendency 
to herding.  
 
9 
 
showed that American institutional investor sentiment had a significant impact on stock returns in 
the UK and Latin American markets. However, the impact of individual sentiment only had a 
significant effect in the UK market. Additionally, they found that sentiment effects in the analyzed 
markets take place at different times, which may represent lower market efficiency. 
Chang, Faff and Hwang (2009) studied the impact of American investor sentiment in 38 stock 
markets over the period of 1977 to 2004. The objective was to analyze to what extent American 
sentiment is contagious across global markets. 
The results showed the existence of an American sentiment contagion effect in markets outside 
the US. Future stock returns that were more prone to the sentiment effect decreased following 
periods of high sentiment. 
Regarding the country development level, the results did not show clear evidence that the 
contagion effect was stronger or weaker in the developed or developing countries. 
The authors found that American investor sentiment spread to other markets through the asset 
holdings of international investors especially for size, book equity/market equity growth and 
dividend portfolios. 
Chang, Faff and Hwang (2009) also found that there was an American investor sentiment 
contagion in markets outside the US, where the quality of the informational environment of the 
market was high. 
As for the role of the corporate governance environment in explaining the observed levels of 
contagion, the authors found that good corporate governance contributed to reducing the spread of 
American investor sentiment to other markets. The results also suggested a strong sentiment 
contagion effect when corporate governance was poor. 
From the study of empirical evidence on the sentiment effects on the stock market an important 
issue derives: how to measure investor sentiment? There are several proposed measures for this 
variable. However, not all are free from criticism, and most importantly, none of the existing 
proposals so far seem to achieve a consensus of most finance researchers. Some of these proposals 
are discussed in the following section. 
 
 
2.2 Sentiment measures 
 
Sentiment measures can be divided into two groups: explicit measures, when the sentiment 
indicator is derived directly from investor surveys and implicit measures, when the indicator is 
obtained from indirect proxies. 
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For explicit measures we emphasize the compilation of investment newsletters by Investors 
Intelligence. In this database, the newsletters are classified into three categories – bullish, bearish 
and waiting for a correction. These measures were used by Fisher and Statman (2000) for sentiment 
of the medium-sized investors, by Brown and Cliff (2005) and Glushkov (2005). For example, Brown 
and Cliff (2005) used the bull-bear spread, which is the difference between the percentage of bullish 
newsletters and the percentage of bearish newsletters, to measure sentiment. 
The Investors surveys – data obtained from the American Association of Individual Investors, also 
reflect explicit measures and were used by Fisher and Statman (2000) for individual investor 
sentiment, by Brown and Cliff (2005) and by Verma and Soydemir (2006).  
The consumer confidence index has also been used as an explicit sentiment measure. For 
example, Qiu and Welch (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Bergman and Roychowdhury 
(2008) and Schmeling (2009) used the consumer confidence index from the University of Michigan 
(UM) as a sentiment measure. Schmeling (2009) also used the consumer confidence index – data 
from Directorale General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). 
Among the implicit measures, there are several proposals for sentiment proxies, for example, the 
mean allocation to stocks in Wall Street strategists’ recommended portfolios was the proxy used by 
Fisher and Statman (2000) for the sentiment of the large investors. 
Another example is the closed-end fund discount (CEFD) a measure used by Lee, Shleifer and 
Thaler (1991) and Hughen and McDonald (2005). The number of new initial public offerings (IPOs), 
used by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991), the put-call trading volume ratio, used by Wang, Keswani and 
Taylor (2006),
6
 are proposed sentiment proxies too. 
Recently composite indices have been proposed, such as the Glushkov (2005) and Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) sentiment proxies. 
Glushkov (2005) proposed an index composed of the bull-bear spread; the dividend premium 
(difference of the average market-to-book ratios of payers and non payers); the closed-end fund 
discount; the percent change in margin borrowing; the ratio of specialists’ short sales to total short 
sales; the net new cash flows of US equity mutual funds; the number and average first-day returns on 
IPOs. 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) used the closed-end fund discount, trading volume as measured by 
NYSE turnover, the number and average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues 
(share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues) and the dividend premium to construct a 
composite sentiment index. 
                                                           
6
 “The put–call trading volume ratio is a measure of market participants’ sentiment derived from options and equals the 
trading volume of put options divided by the trading volume of call options. When market participants are bearish, they buy 
put options either to hedge their spot positions or to speculate bearishly” (p.112). 
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The Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment index has been used by other authors, such as Mian 
and Sankaraguruswamy (2008) and Chang, Faff and Hwang (2009), for example. 
As can be seen, there are various proposals for sentiment measures, even though there is no 
consensus among researchers. The implicit measures have been criticized, particularly because they 
may be contaminated by fundamentals that influence securities returns.  
Moreover, some explicit measures did not correlate with implicit measures as noted by Qiu and 
Welch (2006).  
These authors analyzed two potential proxies for investor sentiment – the CEFD and the 
Michigan Consumer Confidence Index and tried to validate these proxies against a more direct proxy 
for investor sentiment from Survey of Investor Sentiment conducted by UBS/Gallup. 
Qiu and Welch (2006) argued that, contrary to the consumer confidence index, the CEFD cannot 
be a good sentiment proxy based on the following arguments: “First, there can be other factors that 
can influence the CEFD and its changes, as for example, transaction costs, or time-varying liquidity 
premia and agency costs. Second, the CEFD could be disproportionately held by unusual retail 
investors, which may not represent ordinary retail investors” (p. 5). 
The authors argued that, “intrinsically, the consumer confidence index seems to be a concept 
similar to investor sentiment. Many investors are likely to be bullish about the economy when they 
are bulish about the stock market and vice versa. Thus, they considered the possibility of consumer 
confidence index and investor sentiment must be positively correlated” (p. 7). 
Qiu and Welch (2006) found that there was no correlation between the Michigan Consumer 
Confidence Index and the CEFD. However, the results showed a significant positive correlation 
between changes in consumer confidence index and the changes in the UBS/Gallup investor 
sentiment series. However, the authors found that there was no correlation between changes in the 
investor sentiment series from UBS/Gallup and the changes in the CEFD. 
The authors also observed that there was no correlation between Baker and Wurgler´s (2006) 
sentiment index and the consumer confidence index, probably because Baker and Wurgler´s (2006) 
index contains the CEFD. 
Thus, the authors suggest that, based on UBS/Gallup investor sentiment survey data, it was not 
possible to validate the CEFD as a proxy for investor sentiment. In light of the results, Qiu and Welch 
(2006) believe that the CEFD is inadmissible as a reasonable proxy for investor sentiment. 
Nevertheless, they argue that the consumer confidence index can be validated as a proxy for investor 
sentiment, based on UBS/Gallup investor sentiment survey data. 
The authors state that “the mechanism which consumer confidence influences financial returns 
operates neither exclusively through the real underlying economic markets, nor exclusively through 
the financial markets. Instead, both pathways seem to matter” (p. 27). 
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In order to compare their sentiment component of consumer confidence with other measures 
proposed in the literature Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) also analyzed the correlations between 
it and the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment measure and the CEFD. The results were consistent 
with those of Qiu and Welch (2006). According to the authors, this evidence may indicate that 
different measures capture some unrelated components of investor sentiment, or perhaps all have 
gaps regarding the consideration of some important sentiment aspects. 
The consumer confidence indexes include both a rational and emotional components (this can 
represent a valid measure for investor sentiment). 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) consider that the confidence index reflects investor sentiment 
but also the effect of macroeconomic variables. Thus, the authors estimated the regression of the 
confidence indices on a set of macroeconomic variables. They found that approximately 20 percent 
of the confidence index was not explained by those variables. Based on these results, the authors 
considered that the predicted value from the regression is the measure of the fundamental 
component of consumer confidence and the residuals represented sentiment (optimism or 
pessimism).  
Verma and Soydemir (2006) used a similar methodology to separate the rational from the 
irrational component of investor sentiment.  
Although they do not meet the consensus of most researchers, explicit measures have been used 
more often to study the impact of investor sentiment on the markets. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
To examine whether investor sentiment predicts future aggregate stock market returns and 
industry indices returns in Portugal, we follow Schmeling (2009) and initially estimate the predictive 
regression equation of the form: 
 

 = 
,()
+ 
,()
∙  + 
,()
                                                      (1) 
 
Were r
i
t+1 is the monthly return of the aggregate stock market or the industry index at time t+1 
and Sentt is a proxy for lagged Portuguese investor sentiment. 
We later added to the previous relationship a set of macroeconomic factors as control variables 
and estimate the predictive regression equation of the form: 
  
 
13 
 

 = 
,()
+ 
,()
∙  + 
()
,() + 
,()
                               (2) 
 
The term ϕt is a macroeconomic factor matrix. 
In order to analyze the sentiment effect on future returns across horizons, we jointly estimate 
regression equation (1) for forecast horizons of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months in a system of equations and 
perform tests of the form α1
i,(1)
 = 0,  α1
i,(3)
 = 0,  α1
i,(6)
 = 0, α1
i,(12)
 = 0, i.e., we test whether there is a 
jointly significant impact at the 1, 3, 6 and 12 months horizon. Similarly, we jointly estimate 
regression equation (2). So, we estimate the system of regressions equations of the form: 
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Where the variables have the usual meaning.  
In order to examine whether US investor sentiment predicts future aggregate stock market 
returns and industry indices returns, we perform the methodology described above. However, in all 
the regressions equations we replace the Portuguese investor sentiment by the US investor 
sentiment. 
(3) 
(4) 
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The stock market indices used in our study were the MSCI index for Portugal (proxy for the 
market) and industrial indices from Euronext: PSI Basic Material; PSI Industrials; PSI Consumer 
Goods; PSI Consumer Services; PSI Telecommunications; PSI Utilities; PSI Financials; and PSI 
Technology. Table 1 shows the indices descriptive statistics and their data sources, as well as for the 
other variables used in our study. 
The proxy for Portuguese investor sentiment resulted from applying Lemmon and Portniaguina’s 
(2006) methodology, which allowed us to separate the rational from the emotional component of 
the EU economic sentiment indicator (ESI). So, we used the residuals of the regression of ESI on a set 
of macroeconomic factors as a proxy for investor sentiment. We used the ESI instead of the 
consumer confidence index. First because it covers data on consumer and business confidence, 
which could allow us to obtain new and important conclusions about the influence of sentiment. 
Second, given that the consumer confidence index was considered a valid variable to obtain a proxy 
for investor sentiment [by authors such as Qiu and Welch (2006)], then the use of that index will 
allow us to test the robustness of the results later.
7
  
Similarly, we obtain the proxy for US investor sentiment using the Michigan Consumer 
Confidence Index as dependent variable. 
Following Lam and Ang’s (2006) methodology, we obtained macroeconomic factors, from a range 
of global and domestic macroeconomic variables,
8
 applying the principal component analysis 
technique with the Varimax factor rotation method. From this methodology three global principal 
components and three domestic principal components have been identified.
9
 This technique reduces 
the likelihood of multicollinearity among the variables. 
The consideration of global macroeconomic variables as controls, jointly with the domestic ones, 
was motivated by Lam and Ang’s (2006) findings. They verified that global factors were relevant in 
explaining market returns.
10
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
7
 Note that the correlation between sentiment proxies obtained from the ESI and from the consumer confidence index is 
0.67. 
8
 Table 1 provides a description of the variables used in the construction of factors, as well as their data sources. 
9
 Similarly, we performed the same methodology to obtain the US factors from a set of macroeconomic variables (this set 
include the same categories of the macroeconomic variables that we used for the extraction of the Portuguese factors, and 
the respective data were obtained from the OECD and FED databases). However, the data description and the results are 
not included to save space, but are available upon request. 
10
 Lam and Ang (2006) found that Portugal was a country whose stock market returns could be explain more by global than 
by domestic macroeconomic factors.  
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4.1   Results 
 
We start by briefly presenting the main results of the preliminary methodology in extracting the 
macroeconomic factors and the proxy for investor sentiment, because this constituted the starting 
point of this study.
 11
 
Table 2 presents the global and domestic macroeconomic factors extracted by applying the 
principal component analysis technique and the variables represented by each one. 
From the principal component analysis technique three global principal components have been 
identified. The variables represented in each are similar to those in Lam and Ang’s (2006) study 
except for the third factor, which in the study by these authors represented only the US-PMI. In all, 
the three factors explain 96 percent of the variance of the nine macroeconomic variables and each 
factor explains over than 88 percent of the variance of the variables it represents. 
With regard to domestic macroeconomic variables, from the principal component analysis 
technique three domestic principal components have also been identified. The results of this 
procedure were, in part, consistent with those reported by Lam and Ang (2006), except for the first 
factor, which in these authors’ study represented only imports and net trade balance. Overall, the 
three factors explain 87 percent of the variance of the eleven macroeconomic variables and each 
factor explains more than 72 percent of the variance of the variables it represents. 
To obtain a proxy for sentiment we regress ESI monthly values on the global
12
 and domestic 
macroeconomic factors.
13
  Similarly, we perform the same methodology for the consumer confidence 
index. The regression has an adjusted R
2
 of about 85 – 89 percent depending on the index used as 
the dependent variable, indicating that a large part of the variation in ESI/consumer confidence can 
be explained by economic fundamentals, a similar result to that obtained by Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006). However, approximately 11 – 15 percent of the indicator variation is not 
explained by economic fundamentals. In this sense, we considered the regression residual values a 
proxy for sentiment.
14
 
                                                           
11
 Some results are not included to save space, but are available upon request.  
12
 The consideration of global factors was motivated by the fact that Portugal is an open economy. The OECD trade-to-GDP-
ratio (sum of exports and imports divided by GDP) measures a country’s “openness” or “integration” in the world economy: 
In 2008, the value of this indicator for Portugal was 75 percent (last data available at the time of writing in: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx). 
At the level of Portugal´s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in stocks, Eurostat data show that this investment has increased 
significantly since 1997. In 2008, FDI in stocks, as a percentage of GDP, was 28 percent (last data available at the time of 
writing in: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database).  
The results of this regression showed that global factors were statistically significant. 
13
 In all regression processes we have used an estimator that is robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation called 
HAC (heteroskedasticity autocorrelated consistent) proposed by Newey and West (1987, 1994). 
14
 Similarly, we obtain the proxy for US investor sentiment using the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index as dependent 
variable and the American macroeconomic factors as independent variables. The results obtained were consistent with 
those reported by Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), but not included to save space. 
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Given our objective, we estimated the regression equation (1) to the market and to industry 
indices. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results. 
The results show that sentiment has some predictive power for market returns (although not 
reported, the regression´s adjusted R
2
 is 3.2 percent) and is statistically significant (at the 5 percent 
level). In line with previous studies, there is a negative relationship between lag sentiment and stock 
market returns. In other words, following periods of high sentiment market returns decline. In this 
case, an increase of one point in the sentiment level is associated, on average, with a 0.3 percent 
decrease in market returns in the following month. 
In the regressions of the industry indices, sentiment is only statistically significant in the case of 
PSI Industrials, PSI Telecommunications and PSI Utilities (at the 10 percent level). In these industries, 
the capacity for sentiment to anticipate future returns varies between 0.8 and 2.4 percent (values of 
the regression´s adjusted R
2
). These results may indicate that these industries may be more 
vulnerable to the effects of investor sentiment. Following periods of high sentiment, returns in these 
industries decline. In other industries, sentiment seems to have no predictive power on returns.  
Subsequently, we added the macroeconomic factors as control variables
15
 and estimated the 
regression (2). These results are also shown in tables 3 and 4. 
With regard to the aggregate market, the earlier findings remain. In table 3, the change of 
adjusted R
2
 (∆ Adj. R2) denotes the increment of that adjustment measure when sentiment is 
included in the regression, compared to a specification with only macroeconomic factors.
 16
 The 
results show that sentiment is significantly negative even in the presence of control variables, adding 
3.4 percent of predictive power relative to the other predictor variables. 
In the industry indices, with the addition of the macroeconomic factors to the respective 
regressions, sentiment becomes insignificant in predicting the future returns of PSI Industrials and 
PSI Utilities. However, in the case of PSI Telecommunications sentiment is significantly negative (at 
the 10 percent level). Even in the presence of control variables, the results show that sentiment has 
some additional predictive power for PSI Telecommunications returns (1.1 percent). 
In order to analyze the effect of sentiment on future returns for forecast horizons of 1, 3, 6 and 
12 months, we estimated the system regressions (3) and (4) for aggregate market and industry 
indices. The results are also listed in tables 3 and 4. 
We find, for the aggregate market, that investor sentiment has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on future returns for all considered forecasting horizons (1 to 12 months), even in 
the presence of control variables. The statistics of the test of the restrictions α1
i,(1)
 = 0,  α1
i,(3)
 = 0,  
                                                           
15
 With the exception of interest rates, Composite Leading Indicator Index and PMI series, following Lam and Ang (2006), 
the series of the macroeconomic principal components are transformed into rates of change by the formula LN(PCt/PCt-1). 
16
 The results of that regression are not included to save space, but are available upon request. 
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α1
i,(6)
 = 0, α1
i,(12)
 = 0  suggest the hypothesis that the sentiment coefficients are equal to zero should 
be rejected at the significance level of 1 percent. 
It is interesting to note that the impact of sentiment on future returns declines for forecast 
horizon of 12 months. This result may have statistical and economic explications. On the one hand, 
the existence of some uncorrected correlation may represent a limitation and influence the 
relevance of the results for longer horizons. In economic terms this would be an expected result. 
According to Schmeling (2009), the noise trading effect disperses in the long run, since the limits to 
arbitrage tend to become weaker. 
Analyzing the change of the adjusted R
2
 (∆ Adj. R2), we found that sentiment continues to add 
predictive power to macroeconomic factors for future returns for time horizons longer than one 
month.  
Overall, comparing these results with the findings obtained by Schmeling (2009), it seems that 
the Portuguese aggregate market behaviour is similar to the Spanish and American markets. 
The estimation results of systems regressions for industry indices show that investor sentiment 
only has a negative and statistically significant impact on future returns for forecast horizons of 3, 6 
and 12 months only for PSI Telecommunications, PSI Utilities and PSI Technology, even in the 
presence of control variables. The statistics of the test of the restrictions α1
i,(1)
 = 0,  α1
i,(3)
 = 0,  α1
i,(6)
 = 
0, α1
i,(12)
 = 0  suggests the hypothesis that the sentiment coefficients equal to zero should be rejected 
at the significance level of 3 percent. 
The change of the adjusted R
2
 (∆ Adj. R2) shows that sentiment continues to add some predictive 
power to macroeconomic factors for future returns for time horizons longer than one month.  
Note that in the case of PSI Technology and PSI Utilities the results of regression (2) showed that 
sentiment was insignificant in predicting their respective returns; however, this is not the case for 
forecast horizons of 3, 6 and 12 months. For PSI Technology we found that the sentiment impact on 
future returns declines for a forecast horizon of 3 months, indicating that possibly the largest impact 
comes after the first month. 
PSI Telecommunications is the index whose behaviour is more similar to the aggregate market. 
Again, the results for industry indices may have statistical explanations, insofar as the existence 
of some uncorrected correlation may represent a limitation and influence the relevance of the 
results for longer time horizons. 
In order to examine whether US investor sentiment predicts future aggregate stock market 
returns and industry indices returns, we perform the same methodology, but in all the regressions 
equations we replace the Portuguese investor sentiment by the American investor sentiment. 
Overall, we found that US investor sentiment was insignificant in predicting the future aggregate 
stock market returns and industry returns in Portugal for all considered forecasting horizons (1 to 12 
months). 
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4.2   Robustness analysis 
 
In order to check robustness of the results, we applied the methodology described above, but 
using the regression residuals of the consumer confidence index. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the 
results. 
For the aggregate market, comparing the information in table 5 with table 3, the findings are 
similar. The statistics of the test of the restrictions α1
i,(1)
 = 0,  α1
i,(3)
 = 0,  α1
i,(6)
 = 0, α1
i,(12)
 = 0, in the 
case of the proxy for sentiment obtained from the confidence index, suggests the hypothesis that the 
sentiment coefficients equal to zero should be rejected at the significance level of 1 percent. 
Since the consumer confidence index was considered a valid variable to obtain a proxy for 
investor sentiment [by authors such as Qiu and Welch (2006)], then the results in Table 5 confirm the 
findings previously presented concerning to predictive power of sentiment on future market returns. 
The results in Table 6 show that investor sentiment (obtained from the confidence index) has no 
predictive power on industry returns, for forecast horizons of 1 month. Generally speaking, this 
finding confirms the results and considerations presented above except for the case of PSI 
Telecommunications. 
We also verified that investor sentiment has a negative and statistically significant impact on 
future returns for forecast horizons of 3, 6 and 12 months in the case of PSI Telecommunications and 
PSI Utilities and for forecast horizons of 6 and 12 months in the case of PSI Technology. The statistics 
of the test of the restrictions α1
i,(1)
 = 0,  α1
i,(3)
 = 0,  α1
i,(6)
 = 0, α1
i,(12)
 = 0, in the case of the proxy for 
sentiment obtained from the confidence index,  in the case these indices, suggests the hypothesis 
that the sentiment coefficients equal to zero should be rejected at the significance level of 1 percent. 
The change of the adjusted R
2
 (∆ Adj. R2) shows that sentiment continues to add predictive 
power to macroeconomic factors for future returns for time horizons longer than one month.  
For the PSI Telecommunications, PSI Utilities and PSI Technology indices, the largest sentiment 
impact on future returns occurred for a forecast horizon of 6 months. 
Since predictive power of sentiment on future returns was more significant in the market index, 
we applied the same methodology, but using the PSI 20 as proxy for the aggregate market. The 
results of this procedure are summarized in table 7, whose values confirm the above findings. 
The robustness checks, in general, confirm the results obtained, which may mean that the 
sentiment of economic agents in general may be relevant in predicting returns. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The presence of noise traders in the market with sentiment correlated and limits on arbitrage 
constitute some of the arguments in favor of the relevance of investor’s psychological factors in 
capital markets. In this sense, authors such as Fisher and Statman (2000), Shefrin (2001), Brown and 
Cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Schmeling (2009) 
and Wang , Keswani and Taylor (2006) argue that sentiment can influence the behaviour of securities 
in the market, and highlight this fact. 
However, most of the studies cited analyzed the effect of sentiment on certain stock categories 
and focus mainly on the US market. 
In this context, our paper aims to analyze the effect of investor sentiment in a small stock market 
– Portugal between September 1997 and April 2009. 
The results showed that sentiment had a negative impact on future market returns for forecast 
horizons of 1 to 12 months, which in general is consistent with the theoretical considerations of the 
impact of the noise trader behaviour and with the evidence found by Schmeling (2009) for the US 
and Spain. Therefore, Portugal seems to be a market somewhat prone to the influence of sentiment, 
which may be a consequence of its high degree of collectivism. 
In the industry analysis, we found that PSI Telecommunications was the index that showed a 
more similar behaviour to the aggregate market. For the other industry indices sentiment just had 
some predictive power on the future returns of the PSI Utilities and PSI Technology for forecasting 
horizons longer than 1 month. In this area, the results were interesting in showing that these 
industries in particular may be more prone to the influence of investor sentiment.  
Finally, we don’t found a contagious effect of US investor sentiment in Portuguese market and 
industry returns. 
However, we cannot overlook the possibility that the investor sentiment index, used in our 
analysis, also represents the effect of omitted relevant variables, which is one of this study’s 
limitations. 
The reduced period of analysis, in this case due to the availability of data on some of the 
macroeconomic variables, is another limitation. The choice of these variables may represent yet 
another limitation. As stated by Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), the choice of macroeconomic 
indicators may be criticized. Although we tried to make our information set as large as possible, given 
the data available, there is always the risk of omitting relevant variables. 
In terms of future research, extending the study to other markets could reveal interesting results 
regarding the characteristics of countries that may be more susceptible to the influence of 
sentiment. 
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The confirmation of the findings that industries like Telecommunications, Utilities and 
Technology, in particular, may be more susceptible to the influence of investor sentiment and the 
possible reasons that explain this evidence may also represent a challenge for future research. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
  Label Source Obs. Mean SD 
Global 
Macro. 
Variables 
 Consumer Price Index (OECD Total) CPI OECD 
(1)
 190 88,409 13,618 
 Index of Industrial Production (OECD Total) IPI OECD 
(1)
 190 91,902 9,728 
 OECD Assets Reserves (in USD) 
(2)
 IntReserv  OECD 
(1)
 190 1,3222E+12 6,9578E+11 
 OECD Composite Leading Indicator Index
 (3)
 CompLead OECD 
(1)
 190 100,020 2,131 
 OECD Exports (in USD) Exp OECD 
(1)
 190 4,4504E+14 1,6245E+14 
 OECD Imports (in USD) Imp OECD 
(1)
 190 4,7233E+14 1,8828E+14 
 US Discount Rate  USDiscRate FED
 (4)
 190 0,040 0,016 
 US Federal Funds Rate  USFedRate  FED
 (4)
 190 0,039 0,018 
 US Purchasing Manager's Index 
(5)
 USPMI FRB of ST. Louis 
(5)
 190 51,581 5,258 
Domestic 
Macro. 
Variables 
 Consumer Price Index DCPI OECD 
(1)
 190 89,424 11,939 
 Exports (in USD) DExp OECD 
(1)
 190 2,5789E+12 9,4071E+11 
 Foreign Exchange Rate (USD-EUR)  DCamb CBP 
(6)
 190 0,871 0,129 
 Government Expenditure (in USD) Dgov CBP 
(6)
 190 2,0857E+10 1,3940E+10 
 Imports (in USD) DImp OECD 
(1)
 190 3,9950E+12 1,5101E+12 
 Index of Industrial Production DIPI OECD 
(1)
 190 96,444 7,861 
 Long Term Interest Rate 
(7)
 Dtxmlp OECD 
(1)
 190 0,049 0,029 
 Monetary Aggregate M3 (in USD) DM3 CBP 
(6)
 140 1,4864E+11 4,6073E+10 
 Private Consumption (in USD) DCons CBP 
(6)
 172 2,2910E+10 4,6441E+09 
 Short Term Interest Rate 
(8)
 Dtxcp OECD 
(1)
 190 0,059 0,025 
 Unemployment Rate  DDesemp OECD 
(1)
 190 0,063 0,014 
Indices 
 MSCI Portugal Index PTMSCI MSCI 
(9)
 190 0,003 0,065 
 PSI 20  PSI20 CBP 
(6)
 190 0,004 0,062 
 PSI Basic Material PSIBasicMat CBP 
(6)
 111 0,004 0,056 
 PSI Industrials PSIInd CBP 
(6)
 111 0,006 0,075 
 PSI Consumer Goods PSIConsGoods CBP 
(6)
 111 -0,006 0,065 
 PSI Consumer Services PSIConsServ CBP 
(6)
 111 -0,001 0,087 
 PSI Telecommunications PSITelec CBP 
(6)
 111 -0,003 0,078 
 PSI Utilities PSIUtilit CBP 
(6)
 111 0,003 0,061 
 PSI Financials PSIFin CBP 
(6)
 111 -0,007 0,067 
 PSI Technology PSITech CBP 
(6)
 111 -0,013 0,125 
Sent. 
Economic Sentiment Indicator
 (10)
 ESI DG ECFIN 190 98,898 11,049 
Standardized Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) 
(11)
 ConsConf OECD 
(1)
 190 98,745 2,363 
Michigan Consumer Confidence Index SentUSMich FRB of ST. Louis 
(12)
 190 90,219 11,006 
                
 
Some details on variables and their sources   
 
(1) All data from the OECD database were obtained from the website: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.  
(2) “Reserve assets consist of those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities 
for direct financing of payments imbalances. Reserve assets comprise of monetary gold, Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs), reserve position in the Fund, foreign exchange assets (consisting of currency and deposits and securities) and 
other claims. The IMF determines the value of SDRs daily by summing, in US dollars, the values - which are based on 
market exchange rates - of a weighted basket of currencies. The basket and weights are subject to revision from time 
to time.” – OECD definition. 
(3) “The OECD Composite Leading Indicators (CLI) dataset is a subset of the Main Economic Indicators (MEI) database. 
The OECD system of CLI was developed to give early signals of turning points of economic activity. This information is 
of prime importance for economists, businesses and policy makers to enable timely analysis of the current and 
short-term economic situation. CLIs are calculated for 29 OECD countries, 6 non-member economies and 9 zone 
aggregates. A country CLI comprises a set of component series selected from a wide range of key short-term 
economic indicators mainly covered in the MEI database” – OECD definition. 
25 
 
(4) The US Federal Funds Rate and US Discount Rate data was collected from the Federal Reserve website: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/. 
(5) The PMI is a composite index of five "sub-indicators" (production, new orders from customers, supplier deliveries, 
inventories, employment), which are extracted through surveys to US purchasing managers. PMI is an important 
sentiment reading, not only for manufacturing, but also for the economy as a whole. The Institute for Supply 
Management (ISM) has is responsible for maintaining the PMI. The PMI data was collected from the Economic 
Research of Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louis website: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NAPM.  
(6) All data from the Central Bank of Portugal (CBP) database were obtained from the website: 
http://www.bportugal.pt/EstatisticasWEB/. 
(7) We used the yield on 10-year Treasury Bonds as a proxy for long-term interest rate. 
(8) We used the 3-month Euribor interest rate as a proxy for short-term. 
(9) The MSCI Portugal index data was collected from the MSCI website: http://www.mscibarra.com/. 
(10) The Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) conducts regular harmonized surveys for 
different sectors of the economies in the EU to provide information for economic surveillance, short term forecasting 
and economic research. The surveys provide information on a wide range of variables (for example, production, 
business activity, consumer financial situation, unemployment, savings, among others) which are useful to monitor 
cyclical developments. The economic sentiment indicator is made from a range of individual components of the 
industry, services, consumers, construction and retail trade confidence indicators.   
The ESI data was collected from the DG ECFIN website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/time_series/index_en.htm. 
 
(11) “The CCI derived from consumer survey results and are measures which are comparable across countries (members 
and some non-OECD member countries). Comparability has been achieved by careful selection of national indicators, 
and by smoothing, centring, and amplitude adjusting these series.”  
“Consumer opinion surveys are carried out to obtain qualitative information for use in monitoring the current 
economic situation. Typically, they are based on a sample of households and respondents are asked about their 
intentions regarding major purchases, their economic situation now compared with the recent past and their 
expectations for the immediate future. The main characteristic of these types of surveys is that instead of asking for 
exact figures, they usually ask for the direction of change e.g. a question on tendency by reference to a “normal” 
state. Possible answers are generally of the five point scale type e.g. increase sharply/increase slightly/remain the 
same/fall slightly/fall sharply. In presenting the results as a time series, only the balance is shown. That is “same” or 
“normal” answers are ignored and the balance is obtained by taking the difference between percentages of 
respondents giving favourable and unfavourable answers.” In http://stats.oecd.org/. 
 
(12) The Michigan Consumer Confidence Index data was collected from the Economic Research of Federal Reserve Bank of 
ST. Louis website: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NAPM. 
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Table 2 
Panel A 
Macroeconomic variables with substantive factor loadings for the dominant Global Principal Components 
  
Global Principal Components 
GPC1 GPC2 GPC3 
  IPI, CPI, IntReserv, Exp, Imp      USFedRate, USDiscRate          CompLead, USPMI 
    
 Panel B 
Macroeconomic variables with substantive factor loadings for the dominant Domestic Principal Components 
Domestic Principal Components 
DPC1 DPC2 DPC3 
Portugal 
DCPI, DDesemp, DCamb, DExp, 
DImp, DM3, DGov, DCons             Dtxcp, Dtxmlp                        DIPI 
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Index Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2 Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2 Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Sent. (ESI) -0,003 -2,428 ** -0,003 -2,422 ** -0,003 -2,303 ** -0,003 -3,679 *** -0,003 -5,171 *** -0,002 -4,406 *** -0,003 -2,311 ** -0,003 -3,790 *** -0,003 -6,087 *** -0,002 -7,024 ***
GPC
DPC
∆  Adj. R2 3,4% 2,8% 9,1% 18,8% 16,4%
Obs.
(4)
1 Month 3 Months
Table 3
Regression results for the models specified in (1), (2), (3) and (4) with aggregate market returns as dependent variable. ∆ Adj. R2 denotes the incremental adjusted R-squared when sentiment is included as an aditional regressor in the equation. Asterisks refer to the
level of significance: *** 1%, **  5%, * 10%.
No No
127 127
No No
6 Months 12 Months
T-stat T-stat
(2)
1 Month 3 Months
(3)
127 127
6 Months 12 Months
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
Yes Yes Yes
127 127 127 127
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
T-stat
No
No
T-stat
No
(1)
NoPTMSCI
138138
Yes
T-stat T-stat
No
No
Yes
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Index Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Sent. (ESI) 0,000 0,055 0,001 0,578 0,000 -0,072 -0,001 -0,742 -0,001 -1,128 -0,001 -1,550 0,000 0,083 0,000 -0,557 -0,001 -0,928 -0,001 -1,711 *
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,7% -1,1% -0,6% -0,2% 0,8%
Obs.
Sent. (ESI) -0,002 -1,796 * -0,002 -1,299 -0,002 -1,231 -0,002 -2,547 ** -0,001 -1,461 -0,001 -1,051 -0,002 -1,049 -0,002 -2,700 *** -0,001 -1,467 0,000 -1,222
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 0,0% 0,0% 3,8% 0,5% 0,1%
Obs.
Sent. (ESI) 0,000 -0,080 0,001 0,383 -0,001 -1,136 0,000 -0,05 0,000 0,391 0,000 -0,221 -0,001 -0,808 0,000 0,548 0,001 1,577 0,000 1,204
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,8% -0,4% -0,6% 0,7% 0,1%
Obs.
Sent. (ESI) -0,002 -1,353 -0,002 -1,149 -0,002 -1,133 -0,002 -1,529 -0,002 -2,098 ** -0,001 -1,949 * -0,002 -1,047 -0,001 -1,486 -0,001 -2,460 ** -0,001 -2,691 ***
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,3% 0,0% -0,3% 2,4% 2,1%
Obs.
Sent. (ESI) -0,003 -1,785 * -0,003 -1,940 * -0,002 -1,378 -0,002 -2,120 ** -0,002 2,440 ** -0,001 -2,583 ** -0,003 -1,527 -0,002 -2,093 ** -0,002 -2,754 *** -0,001 -4,662 ***
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 1,1% 1,2% 2,5% 3,7% 4,1%
Obs.
Sent. (ESI) -0,003 -1,856 * -0,002 -1,547 -0,002 -1,476 -0,002 -2,661 *** -0,003 -4,285 *** -0,002 -3,703 *** -0,002 -1,497 -0,002 -2,729 *** -0,002 -6,511 *** -0,002 -6,352 ***
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 1,2% 1,0% 3,7% 11,0% 8,9%
Obs.
Sent. (ESI) 0,000 -0,017 0,001 0,709 0,000 -0,178 -0,001 -0,590 -0,001 -1,138 -0,001 -1,678 * 0,000 0,114 0,000 0,083 0,000 -0,752 -0,001 -1,772 *
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,6% -1,0% -0,8% -0,3% 1,0%
Obs.
Sent. (ESI) -0,003 -1,14 -0,003 -1,114 -0,003 -0,946 -0,002 -1,716 * -0,002 -1,804 * -0,002 -2,275 ** -0,003 -0,896 -0,002 -1,741 * -0,002 -2,090 ** -0,002 -3,220 **
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,4% -0,3% 1,6% 2,2% 4,1%
Obs. 100
17,2% 55,5%
100 100
Table 4
100 100 100 100
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 30,7%
111 111 100
Yes
2,2% 4,0% 0,5%
No No
1,9%
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes YesNo Yes No
No No Yes YesYes No No
100 100 100
PSITech
No
100 100 100111 111 100 100
1,7% 7,2% 29,4% 44,9% 53,8%
Yes
0,0% 14,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,3%
No Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
No Yes No No No
No No Yes YesYes No No
100 100 100
PSIFin
No
100 100 100111 111 100 100
11,2% 11,9% 41,7% 73,3% 77,2%
Yes
2,4% 15,1% 1,1% 5,7% 14,7%
No Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
No Yes No No No
No No Yes YesYes No No
100 100 100
PSIUtilit
No
100 100 100111 111 100 100
5,3% 5,9% 22,9% 42,7% 80,2%
Yes
1,4% 6,3% 0,9% 3,3% 4,7%
No Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
No Yes No No No
No No Yes YesYes No No
100 100 100
PSITelec
No
100 100 100111 111 100 100
2,7% 1,5% 29,7% 50,9% 66,2%
Yes
0,3% 4,3% 2,6% 1,3% 3,2%
No Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
No Yes No No No
No No Yes YesYes No No
100 100 100
PSI  
ConsServ
No
100 100 100111 111 100 100
0,0% 10,8% 22,8% 53,6% 75,6%
Yes
0,0% 10,3% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0%
No Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
No Yes No No No
No No Yes YesYes No No
100 100 100
PSICons
Goods
No
100 100 100111 111 100 100
0,0% 9,5% 37,6% 55,1% 81,1%
Yes
0,8% 13,3% 0,5% 5,1% 1,1%
No Yes Yes YesYes No No No
No Yes Yes Yes YesNo No No
100
PSIInd
No Yes
100 100 100 100
24,9% 54,9%
111 111 100 100 100
0,3% 1,4% 2,5% 13,7%
Yes Yes Yes
0,0% 7,8% 0,0% 0,0%
No No YesNo Yes No No
No Yes Yes Yes YesNo Yes No No No
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
PSIBasic
Mat
1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Regression results for the models specified in (1), (2), (3) and (4) with sectorial returns as dependent variable. ∆ Adj. R2 denotes the incremental adjusted R-squared when sentiment is included as an aditional regressor in the equation. Asterisks refer to the level of
significance: *** 1%, **  5%, * 10%.
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
1 Month
No
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Index Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Sent. (ConsConf) -0,015 -2,364 ** -0,015 -2,230 ** -0,013 -1,997 ** -0,013 -3,223 *** -0,013 -4,306 *** -0,010 -3,838 *** -0,014 -2,208 ** -0,015 -3,755 *** -0,014 -5,219 *** -0,010 -5,385 ***
GPC
DPC
∆  Adj. R2 2,4% 2,4% 8,9% 14,5% 10,7%
Obs. 127 127 127 127138 138 127 127 127 127
Yes YesNo No Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No No
No No YesNo Yes No No
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
PTMSCI
3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
(4)
1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 1 Month
Table 5 - Robustness analysis
Regression results for the models specified in  (1), (2), (3) and (4) with aggregate market returns as dependent variable. ∆  Adj. R2 denotes the incremental adjusted R-squared when sentiment (ConsConf) is included as an aditional regressor in the equation. Asterisks refer 
to the level of significance: *** 1%, **  5%, * 10%.
(1) (2)
(3)
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Index Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Sent. (ConsConf) 0,003 0,678 0,006 1,225 0,002 0,398 -0,001 -0,336 -0,003 -1,038 -0,004 -1,810 * 0,003 0,547 0,000 -0,071 -0,002 -0,742 -0,002 -1,533
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,1% -0,8% -0,9% -0,4% 0,5%
Obs.
Sent. (ConsConf) -0,005 -0,757 -0,002 -0,240 -0,005 -0,648 -0,005 -0,985 ** -0,002 -0,372 -0,003 -0,990 -0,005 -0,575 -0,003 0,658 0,002 0,540 0,001 0,369
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,8% -0,7% -0,4% -0,3% -0,2%
Obs.
Sent. (ConsConf) 0,001 0,220 0,003 0,488 0,002 0,279 0,001 0,351 -0,001 -0,189 -0,002 -0,954 0,003 0,504 0,004 1,197 0,003 1,368 0,001 0,838
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,8% -0,7% 0,3% 0,4% -0,1%
Obs.
Sent. (ConsConf) 0,002 0,267 0,004 0,549 0,003 0,278 -0,001 -0,225 0,000 0,529 -0,003 -1,014 0,004 0,363 0,002 0,456 0,001 0,401 0,000 -0,026
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,8% -1,0% -1,7% -0,5% -0,4%
Obs.
Sent. (ConsConf) -0,007 -1,032 -0,005 -0,783 -0,005 -0,608 -0,009 -1,937 * -0,011 -3,229 *** -0,009 -3,364 *** -0,005 -0,550 -0,008 -1,879 * -0,009 -3,537 *** -0,006 -5,369 ***
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,2% -0,8% 1,9% 6,2% 5,2%
Obs.
Sent. (ConsConf) -0,008 -1,148 -0,005 -0,752 -0,009 -1,292 -0,012 -2,852 *** -0,014 -4,303 *** -0,011 -3,913 *** -0,007 -1,130 -0,009 -2,867 *** -0,011 -6,158 *** -0,009 -6,129 ***
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,5% 0,2% 4,1% 10,1% 8,4%
Obs.
Sent. (ConsConf) -0,002 -0,251 0,003 0,447 0,000 -0,045 -0,001 -0,299 -0,003 -0,876 -0,006 -1,733 * 0,002 0,375 0,002 -1,151 0,000 -0,086 -0,003 -1,225
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,7% -0,8% -0,7% -0,6% 0,2%
Obs.
Sent. (ConsConf) -0,002 -0,23 -0,001 -0,090 -0,001 -0,035 -0,007 -1,064 -0,010 -2,110 ** -0,008 -2,197 ** -0,004 -0,268 -0,008 -1,281 -0,011 -2,621 ** -0,008 -3,055 ***
GPC
DPC
Adj. R
2
∆  Adj. R2 -0,4% -0,8% 0,5% 3,8% 3,7%
Obs. 100 100100 100 100 100
16,1% 32,3% 55,1%
111 111 100 100
3,3% 3,6% 0,0%0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1%
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
No Yes No No No
No Yes Yes YesYes No No No
100 100
PSITech
No
100 100 100 100
29,5% 44,6% 53,0%
111 111 100 100
0,0% 1,9% 7,4%0,0% 13,9% 0,0% 0,0%
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
No Yes No No No
No Yes Yes YesYes No No No
100 100
PSIFin
No
100 100 100 100
42,1% 72,4% 76,7%
111 111 100 100
14,8% 12,4% 11,1%0,3% 13,4% 0,6% 6,6%
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
No Yes No No No
No Yes Yes YesYes No No No
100 100
PSIUtilit
No
100 100 100 100
22,3% 45,2% 81,3%
111 111 100 100
8,5% 5,3% 3,9%0,0% 5,0% 0,0% 2,6%
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
No Yes No No No
No Yes Yes YesYes No No No
100 100
PSITelec
No
100 100 100 100
28,3% 48,0% 63,7%
111 111 100 100
0,0% 0,0% 0,5%0,0% 3,8% 0,0% 0,0%
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
No Yes No No No
No Yes Yes YesYes No No No
100 100
PSI  
ConsServ
No
100 100 100 100
23,7% 53,3% 75,4%
111 111 100 100
0,0% 0,0% 10,5%
Yes Yes Yes Yes
0,0% 10,3% 0,0% 0,0%
No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No
No No No
PSICons
Goods
No Yes No
100 100 100 100 100
80,8%
111 111 100 100 100
0,0% 8,8% 33,4% 54,3%
Yes Yes
0,0% 12,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
No No Yes YesYes No No
No Yes Yes Yes YesNo No No
100 100
PSIInd
No
100 100 100 100
13,4% 24,7% 54,6%
111 111 100 100
0,5% 1,4% 2,8%
Yes Yes Yes Yes
0,0% 8,4% 0,0% 0,0%
No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No
No No No
PSIBasic
Mat
No Yes No
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Table 6 - Robustness analysis
Regression results for the models specified in (1), (2), (3) and (4) with sectorial returns as dependent variable. ∆ Adj. R2 denotes the incremental adjusted R-squared when sentiment (ConsConf) is included as an aditional regressor in the equation. Asterisks refer to the
level of significance: *** 1%, **  5%, * 10%.
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
1 Month
Yes
No
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Index Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Coeff.
∆   Adj. 
R
2
Sent. (ESI) -0,003 -2,155 ** -0,003 -2,330 ** -0,002 -1,903 * -0,003 -3,523 *** -0,002 -3,808 *** -0,001 -2,666 *** -0,002 -1,879 * -0,003 -3,623 *** -0,002 -4,512 *** -0,002 -4,724 ***
GPC
DPC
∆  Adj. R2 2,4% 1,9% 8,9% 10,6% 7,0%
Obs.
Table 7 - Robustness analysis
Regression results for the models specified in (1), (2), (3) and (4) with aggregate market returns as dependent variable. ∆ Adj. R2 denotes the incremental adjusted R-squared when sentiment is included as an aditional regressor in the equation. Asterisks refer to the
level of significance: *** 1%, **  5%, * 10%.
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat
PSI 20
No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
138 138 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
